Philosophy of Action
Published
How to Perform a Nonbasic Action
Noûs. Forthcoming.
Under Review
A Control Theory of Action
Separating Action and Knowledge
In Preparation
The Ethical Function of Intentional Action
I argue that intentional action is, in a sense, intrinsically ethical. The central claim that I defend is the following two-part thesis spelling out the precise sense in which intentional action is intrinsically ethical. First, the concept of intentional action plays a functional role in our ethical conceptual scheme: it flags behaviors that are of priority for ethical evaluation broadly construed. Second, by way of fixing the degree of control required for intentional action, this ethical functional role partially determines the extension of the concept of intentional action. As we will see, the sense in which intentional action is intrinsically ethical is also, to a large degree, consistent with naturalistic theories of action and thus should be appealing to the naturalist.
Some slides can be found here.
To act, must I aim?
A paper arguing for what I call the Aim Condition on Action (ACA): action in the broadest sense requires meeting an explanatorily relevant aim that belongs to the agent. ACA entails that individuals that are incapable of having aims are not genuine agents. It follows, on the plausible empirical claim that many living and non-living individuals are incapable of aiming, that many living and non-living individuals are not genuine agents. Establishing ACA also marks a significant step in defending the control theory of action as a theory of action in the broadest sense.
On the Incompatibility of Rational and Necessary Connections between Action and Knowledge
In this note, I show the incompatibility of rational and necessary connections between action and knowledge, assuming a plausible view on the relation between rationality and necessity. I then show, more generally, how insofar as normative requirements must be violable to be action guiding, metaphysical and normative investigations into the connections between philosophical concepts constrain one another.
Action in a Virtual World
Danny, a married man, has a virtual affair with his lifelong friend Karl while playing a virtual reality fighting game. Each night over a number of weeks, Danny and Karl place small buttons on their temples, their physical forms go motionless, and they enter virtual reality, taking on the forms of their chosen characters Lance and Roxette. Danny and Karl (or Lance and Roxette?) start out fighting one another in the game but eventually turn to having sex. This story, drawn from an episode of Black Mirror, raises a number of interesting and difficult philosophical questions, and one is especially relevant for philosophers of action: can the doings of one's virtual counterpart in virtual reality be one's actions? In particular, does Danny have sex with Karl---or perform any action at all---while his physical body lay motionless on the couch in physical reality? In this essay, I try to isolate exactly what is interesting and difficult about these questions. I then offer some possible answers.