Deliberative Indispensability, Epistemic Justification, and Being a Successful Inquirer (in preparation)
Enoch (2007, 2011) offers a novel argument to the conclusion that we are prima facie epistemically justified to believe in the existence of irreducibly normative facts. The key epistemological claim that the argument relies on is: in virtue of the fact that irreducibly normative facts are instrumentally indispensable to the intrinsically indispensable project of practical deliberation, we are prima facie epistemically justified to believe that such facts exist. McPherson and Plunkett (2015) offer a compelling objection to this key epistemological claim, namely that it fails to respect a basic connection between epistemic justification and truth. In this paper, I offer an improved version of Enoch's deliberative indispensability argument that avoids this objection of McPherson and Plunkett and thereby has a stronger epistemological core. The improved argument is based on the thought that in light of our agential natures, engaging in practical deliberation is constitutive of being a successful inquirer for creatures like us.