Zetetic Indispensability and Epistemic Justification
Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. According to Enoch’s (2007, 2011) deliberative indispensability argument, we are so justified because robustly real normative facts are instrumentally indispensable to the rationally non-optional project of practical deliberation. However, at the center of this argument is an account of the sources of basic epistemic justification which, as McPherson and Plunkett (2015) convincingly argue, fails to respect the close connection between epistemic justification and truth. In this paper, I offer an improved deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism by offering an alternative account of the sources of basic epistemic justification that respects the close connection between epistemic justification and truth. The improved indispensability argument is based on the thought that in light of our agential natures, engaging in practical deliberation is constitutive of being a successful inquirer for creatures like us.