On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets
Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
A paper on accuracy and subjective Bayesianism (under review)
with Sven Neth.
We argue that subjective Bayesians face a dilemma: they must offend against the spirit of their permissivism about rational credence or deny the principle that one should avoid accuracy dominance.
A Contextual Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism (in preparation)
A central motivation for Probabilism---the principle of rationality that requires one to have credences that satisfy the axioms of probability---is the accuracy dominance argument: one should not have accuracy dominated credences, and one avoids accuracy dominance just in case one satisfies Probabilism. Up until recently, the accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism has been restricted to the finite setting. One reason for this is that it is not easy to measure the accuracy of infinitely many credences in a motivated way. In particular, as recent work has shown, the conditions often imposed in the finite setting are mutually inconsistent in the infinite setting. One response to these impossibility results---the one taken by Michael Nielsen---is to weaken the conditions on a legitimate measure of accuracy. However, this response runs the risk of offering an accuracy dominance argument using illegitimate measures of accuracy. In this paper, I offer an alternative response which concedes the possibility that not all sets of credences can be measured for accuracy. I then offer an accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism that allows for this restrictedness. The normative core of the argument is the principle that one should not have credences that would be accuracy dominated in some epistemic context one might find oneself in if there are alternative credences which do not have this defect.